Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Inferential role: the inferential role is the variation potential that linguistic expressions have within conclusions. The reference to truth thus emerges only indirectly in the evaluation of the overall argumentation and not every speaker is aware of this. See also Inferential content, Inferences, Inferentialism, R. Brandom, cf. Conceptual role, Roles._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Ned Block on Inferential Role - Dictionary of Arguments
Fodor IV 168 Inferential Role/Coextension/Inference/Block: Thesis: the inferential role of coextensive expressions can differ. Thus, the theory of the conceptual role can distinguish between e.g. morning star/evening star, or between "Cicero" and "Tullius". (Intension/Extension). I.e. it is fine-grained enough. Block knows, however, that this is not guaranteed. See also >Morning Star/Evening Star, >fine grained/coarse grained._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |